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INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY 
AND THE SUPERNATURAL—
THE “GOD OR EXTRA-TERRESTRIALS” REPLY
Elliott  Sober
When proponents of Intelligent Design (ID) theory deny that their theory is 
religious, the minimalistic theory they have in mind (the mini-ID theory) is the 
claim that the irreducibly complex adaptations found in nature were made by 
one or more intelligent designers. The denial that this theory is religious rests 
on the fact that it does not specify the identity of the designer—a supernatural 
God or a team of extra-terrestrials could have done the work. The present paper 
att empts to show that this reply underestimates the commitments of the mini-
ID Theory. The mini-ID theory, when supplemented with four independently 
plausible further assumptions, entails the existence of a supernatural intelli-
gent designer. It is further argued that scientifi c theories, such as the Darwin-
ian theory of evolution, are neutral on the question of whether supernatural 
designers exist.
1. Will the Real ID Theory Please Stand Up?
What is Intelligent Design (ID) theory? Answering this question is com-
plicated by the fact that one version of the theory is minimalistic, while 
others are more contentful. The minimalistic version, which I’ll call the 
mini-ID theory, says only that the irreducibly complex adaptations that 
organisms possess were made by one or more intelligent designers (Behe 
1996, 2005; Dembski 1995, 1998b, p.15). The identities of these designers 
are not specifi ed; maybe the vertebrate eye was made by a team of Extra 
Terrestrials or by a God who lives outside of space and time. The mini-ID 
theory does not deny that human beings have common ancestors with 
other species, nor does it insist that the earth is young, nor does it oﬀ er an 
explanation of the origin of the universe. The mini-ID theory diﬀ ers from 
some earlier versions of Creationism by virtue of its modesty.1
Defenders of the mini-ID theory have a lot more to say about intelligent 
design, and this is where more contentful versions of ID theory make their 
appearance. For example, Phillip Johnson (1996), one of the main architects 
of ID theory, endorses theistic realism, “aﬃ  rm[ing] that God is objectively 
real as Creator, and that the reality of God is tangibly recorded in evidence 
accessible to science, particularly biology;” he says that this is “the defi ning 
concept of our movement.” In their widely used ID textbook, Of Pandas and 
People, Percival Davis and Dean Kenyon (1993, pp. 7, 26, 100) frequently 
contrast “natural” and “intelligent” causes; this indicates that the intelligent 
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designers they have in mind are supernatural. And Dembski (1998b, p. 20) 
rejects theistic evolutionism, which is the thesis that God used the evolution-
ary process to produce organisms and their adaptive features. Dembski’s 
gripe is with evolutionary theory, not with divine design.2
Given the many ways in which ID theorizing goes beyond the mini-ID 
theory, why was the mini-ID theory ever formulated as a separate claim? 
One reason is suggested by Johnson’s comment that “people of diﬀ ering 
theological views should learn who’s close to them, form alliances and 
put aside divisive issues ‘til later. . . . I say aft er we’ve sett led the issue of a 
Creator, we’ll have a wonderful time arguing about the age of the Earth” 
(quoted in Walker 1998, p. 24). A modest theory has the virtue of uniting 
the warring factions against a common enemy. In addition, by not using 
the word “God,” the mini-ID theory may have a bett er chance than some 
of its Creationist predecessors of passing the Constitutional test that bars 
promoting religion in public schools.
Another motive is revealed by the Discovery Institute’s “Wedge Strategy” 
(available at www.antievolution.org/features/wedge.htm). The Discovery 
Institute in Seatt le is the fl agship ID think tank and the “Wedge Strategy” is 
its political manifesto. The document is an internal memo that was leaked 
on the Internet in 1999; the Institute says its goal is to “replace materialistic 
explanations with the theistic understanding that nature and human be-
ings are created by God.” Phillip Johnson’s (1991) critique of Darwinism 
and Michael Behe’s (1995) application of the mini-ID theory to some com-
plex biochemical adaptations are described as the “thin edge of the wedge,” 
whose purpose is to split the “giant tree” of “materialistic science.” Accord-
ing to the Wedge Strategy, “design theory promises to reverse the stifl ing 
dominance of the materialist worldview, and to replace it with a science 
consonant with Christian and theistic convictions.”
What, then, is ID theory? Is it just the mini-ID theory, or the more con-
tentful hypothesis that the adaptations of organisms and the universe 
itself were created by the Christian God, or is it something in between? 
The second of these is obviously religious in content, but the fi rst, appar-
ently, is not. It is not the point of the present paper to discuss any further 
the motives behind the construction of the mini-ID theory nor to argue 
that one of these versions of ID theory is the “real” theory of intelligent 
design. Rather, the goal is to trace out the implications of what the mini-
ID theory actually asserts. The mini-ID theory does imply the existence 
of a supernatural intelligent designer when it is supplemented by four 
propositions that are independently supported.
2. A First Cause Argument Applied to the Mini-ID Theory
Consider the following argument, which owes a debt to Thomas Aquinas. 
It is not an argument that I am advocating, but one to which ID theorists 
need to respond.
1. If a system found in nature is irreducibly complex, then it was caused 
to exist by an intelligent designer.
2. Some of the minds found in nature are irreducibly complex.
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3. Therefore some of the minds found in nature were caused to exist by 
an intelligent designer.
4. Any mind in nature that designs and builds an irreducibly complex 
system is itself irreducibly complex.
5. If the universe is fi nitely old and if cause precedes eﬀ ect, then at 
least one of the minds found in nature was not created by any mind 
found in nature.
6. The universe is fi nitely old.
7. In nature, causes precede their eﬀ ects.
8. Therefore, there exists a supernatural intelligent designer.
In this argument, apparently non-religious premises lead to an apparently 
religious conclusion.
3. Comments on the Argument
Premise (1) is the central claim of the mini-ID theory. I use Behe’s (1996, p. 
39) term “irreducible complexity,” which he defi nes as “[A] single system 
composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the 
basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes the 
system to eﬀ ectively stop functioning.”3 Behe’s idea is the same one that 
moved Paley (1800); the watch and the eye have functions (to measure 
time, to allow organisms to see) and each would fail to perform its func-
tion if one of its interacting parts were excised.
Premise (2) can be true even if we aren’t certain about which natural 
systems have minds. I assume that human beings have minds. The accom-
panying Figure provides a reason for thinking that the human mind is irre-
ducibly complex.4 The overall function of the system is to allow individuals 
to navigate their environments eﬀ ectively.5 Our present beliefs and desires 
are infl uenced by the perceptual states we now are in, plus our memories; 
these beliefs and desires give rise to an intention (a plan of action) by pass-
ing into a decision procedure of some sort. Intentions issue in actions. If 
any of the parts depicted here were removed, the mind would be unable to 
perform its function. Premise (2) does not require that this division of the 
human mind into parts is complete. This division not only characterizes 
human beings; I suggest that it also describes the minds of intelligent be-
ings who design and produce irreducibly complex systems, whether they 
happen to be human beings or not. This is the justifi cation for premise (4).
A schematic of the human mind 







INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY AND THE SUPERNATURAL 75
There is an objection to premise (2), and also to (4), that stems from an 
ambiguity in Behe’s concept of irreducible complexity. There are many ways 
to segment a system into parts; whether a system is taken to be irreducibly 
complex depends on how fi ne-grained the division into parts is. Consider 
the eye. If the parts of someone’s eye are taken to be the cornea, the retina, 
etc., the system will be judged to be irreducibly complex. However, if the 
parts of the eye are taken to be the atoms of which it is made, the conclusion 
that follows is that the system is not irreducibly complex; excise a single 
atom and the eye still sees. This suggests that what Behe intends is that a 
system should be judged irreducibly complex precisely when some segmen-
tation into parts satisfi es the condition, not that every segmentation must 
do so. However, this interpretation raises the problem that many highly 
redundant systems will be judged to be irreducibly complex when a coarse-
grained division into parts is used. Consider the wine bott le. Its function, I 
take it, is to hold a certain liquid. There is a very fi ne-grained segmentation 
into parts that entails that the bott le is not irreducibly complex, since shav-
ing a tiny slice oﬀ  the surface does not impair the bott le’s ability to hold a 
liquid. However, there is another division that leads to the opposite con-
clusion. Suppose we divide the bott le into a number of identically shaped 
top-to-bott om slices; if we remove any of these parts, the bott le no longer 
can serve as a container for liquids. A possible response to this problem is 
to claim that there is a uniquely correct segmentation of a system into parts; 
however, this raises the question of how that uniquely correct breakdown is 
to be defi ned and defended. I mention this problem because it shows that it 
is a mistake to argue against premise (2) by saying that a very fi ne-grained 
segmentation of the human mind into parts leads to the conclusion that the 
human mind is not irreducibly complex. I don’t know how Behe’s concept 
should be clarifi ed, but it does seem that those who hold that the bacterial 
fl agellum and the biochemistry of blood coagulation are irreducibly com-
plex should also hold that the human mind is irreducibly complex.
Premise (6) is also not part of the mini-ID theory; rather, it is part of our 
current best scientifi c understanding of the world. Physics tells us that the 
universe is fi nitely old.6 The same is true of premise (7); it isn’t part of the 
mini-ID theory, though it seems entirely plausible that causes in nature 
precede their eﬀ ects.7
To summarize the argument: If the human minds that now exist in 
nature are irreducibly complex, then each of them was caused to exist 
by one or more earlier intelligent designers. Consider one of those ear-
lier designers; either it is found in nature or it is a supernatural being. 
If the latt er, we’re done—proposition (8) follows. So consider the former 
option. That intelligent designer, if it designed and produced an irre-
ducibly complex mind, must have a mind that is irreducibly complex. 
If there is a fi nite amount of time ε such that it takes a mind in nature 
(e.g., a human agent) at least ε to design and build another irreducibly 
complex intelligent designer, then the causal chains that connect a later 
intelligent designer in nature to its earlier intelligent designer cause (also 
in nature) will have fi nitely many links. Each such chain, traced back into 
the fi nite past, must therefore reach a fi rst intelligent designer in nature. 
But premise (1) says that these fi rst natural minds, being irreducibly 
complex, must themselves be caused to exist by an intelligent designer, 
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so the argument leads to the conclusion that a supernatural intelligent 
designer must exist.8
Behe (1996, p. 249) seems to have something like this argument in mind 
in the following passage where he recognizes that there is a connection 
within the ID framework between the question of backwards causation 
and the question of whether a supernatural designer exists:
Perhaps, then, biochemists in the future will send back cells to the 
early earth that contain the information for the irreducibly complex 
structures we observe today. In this scenario humans can be their 
own aliens, their own advanced civilizations. Of course, time travel 
leads to apparent paradoxes (things like grandsons shooting grand-
fathers before their oﬀ spring are born), but at least some physicists 
are ready to accept them. Most people, like me, will fi nd these sce-
narios entirely unsatisfactory, but they are available for those who 
wish to avoid unpleasant theological implications.
Behe agrees with premise 7 in the Aquinas-style argument, in that he fi nds 
backwards causation, at least in this instance, “entirely unsatisfactory.” 
There is even the suggestion that he embraces the “theological implica-
tions” that fl ow from the mini-ID theory.
4. Does the Mini-ID Theory Have Implications about 
the Existence of Supernatural Beings?
The previous argument relies on four assumptions that are not part of 
the mini-ID theory. The mini-ID theory does not say that the universe is 
fi nitely old,9 it does not insist that causes in nature precede their eﬀ ects, it 
does not say that the human mind is irreducibly complex, and it does not 
claim that the minds in nature that design and produce irreducibly com-
plex systems are themselves irreducibly complex. What follows from the 
theory, understood narrowly, is just that if these four assumptions are cor-
rect, then there must be a supernatural intelligent designer. Do these four 
ifs save the mini-ID theory from having implications about the existence 
of supernatural beings? According to a narrow defi nition of this type of 
implication, they do:
(N) A proposition P has implications about the existence of supernat-
ural beings if and only if P entails that a supernatural being exists 
or entails that there are no supernatural beings.
The question is whether some broader interpretation of a theory’s having 
“implications about the existence of supernatural beings” can be defi ned 
that is plausible. Here is a defi nition to consider:
(B) A proposition P has implications about the existence of supernatu-
ral beings if and only if there exist true auxiliary assumptions A 
such that P&A entails that a supernatural being exists, or entails 
that there are no supernatural beings, but A by itself does not.
This broader criterion entails that the mini-ID theory has implications about 
the existence of supernatural beings. However, criterion (B) is problematic 
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because it entails that every false proposition has such implications. For 
if P is false, then “notP or supernatural beings exist” is true and P, when 
conjoined with this disjunction, entails that there are supernatural beings 
while the disjunction, by itself, does not. This defect in (B) is reminiscent 
of the problems the logical positivists uncovered when they tried to de-
fi ne what it means for a statement to have observational implications, and 
the repeated failures of diﬀ erent formulations of the verifi cation theory of 
meaning should serve as a warning in connection with the present project 
(Hempel 1950).
I am inclined to think that the concept of having implications about the 
existence of supernatural beings, like the concept of having observational 
implications, cannot be spelled out by using just the tools of deductive 
logic. Rather, I suspect that both concepts are epistemic. With respect to the 
idea of observational testability, I suggest the following:
(Ob) Proposition P now has observational implications if and only if 
there exist auxiliary assumptions A and an observation statement 
O such that (i) P&A entails O, but A by itself does not entail O, 
(ii) A is true, (iii) we now are justifi ed in believing A, and (iv) the 
justifi cation we now have for believing A does not depend on be-
lieving that P is true (or that it is false), and also does not depend 
on believing that O is true (or that it is false).
Further articulating this criterion would require discussing what an 
observation statement is (Sober 1999, 2006), but I think we can let that 
pass in the present context. Criterion (Ob) judges, correctly, that the laws 
of optics now have observational implications about the occurrence of 
eclipses. The laws, by themselves, do not make any such predictions, 
but when independently obtained information about the earth, sun, and 
moon are added, the resulting conjunction does have such implications.
Criterion (Ob) is time indexed (“now” represents any time t) so that a 
proposition can fail to have observational implications at one time though 
it has such implications at another. This refl ects the fact that there is a per-
fectly legitimate sense in which a proposition might be empirically testable 
at one time but not at another. However, criterion (Ob) does not rule out 
the possibility that there might be other, more “modalized,” explications 
of testability. For example, one might wish to defi ne a timeless concept in 
which a proposition P is said to have observational consequences precisely 
when there exists a true auxiliary proposition A that could be justifi ed in-
dependently of having a belief as to whether P is true and independently 
of having a belief as to whether O is true, where P&A entails O while A by 
itself does not. This more modal concept of testability would be needed if 
one wanted to say that some propositions not only can’t be tested now but 
are intrinsically incapable of ever being tested. This is the idea of untest-
ability in principle that the positivists wanted to isolate. There is no special 
problem in defi ning this concept (though the concept of possibility needs 
to be clarifi ed); rather, the diﬃ  culty arises in connection with applying 
it. To say that a proposition is untestable in principle apparently requires 
omniscience about the future of inquiry; one would have to be able to say 
that no auxiliary principle A could ever be discovered that would permit 
P to have observational consequences. This is why I prefer the weaker, less 
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modal, concept of testability—the concept of testability now. Of course, if 
a proposition is now testable, it is testable in principle. But if a proposition 
now can’t be tested and one can’t imagine the situation ever changing, 
what does that show? Is the proposition untestable in principle or is one 
simply guilty of a failure of imagination? There is no need to address this 
question here.
The following defi nition of what it means for a proposition now to 
have implications about the existence of supernatural beings parallels the 
defi nition of observational implication provided by (Ob):
(E) Proposition P now has implications about the existence of super-
natural beings if and only if there exist auxiliary assumptions A 
such that (i) P&A entails that there are supernatural beings, or 
entails that there are none, but A by itself does not have either 
implication, (ii) A is true, (iii) we now are justifi ed in believing 
A, and (iv) the justifi cation we now have for believing A does not 
depend on believing that P is true (or that it is false), and also 
does not depend on believing that there are supernatural beings 
(or on believing that there are none).
This epistemic criterion entails that the mini-ID theory now has implica-
tions about the existence of supernatural beings; this is because we now 
are justifi ed in believing the four assumptions used in the argument pre-
sented earlier and our justifi cation for these four beliefs does not depend 
on our assuming the mini-ID theory (or its negation), nor does it depend 
on our having a belief as to whether supernatural beings exist.
Why accept the epistemic characterization (E) of what it takes for a 
proposition to have implications about the existence of supernatural 
beings? Why not reject this and embrace only the narrower criterion (N)? 
The parallel with the problem of defi ning the concept of observational 
implication provides a reason. Duhem (1914) was right that physical 
theories, by themselves, do not have observational consequences. But it 
would be a mistake to conclude that these theories have no observational 
consequences. In just the same way, it is true that men, by themselves, do 
not have children, but it would be a mistake to conclude that men never 
have children. A concept of observational implication is needed that takes 
Duhem’s point into account but explains how theories manage to make 
observational predictions. Criterion (Ob) does this. The same approach 
leads to the proposal embodied in (E).
Criterion (E) defi nes the concept of having implications about the 
existence of supernatural beings, but not the broader concept of having 
implications about the supernatural. To see the diﬀ erence, consider the 
thesis that at most one supernatural being exists. This thesis does not entail 
that a supernatural being exists, nor does it entail that none does, but the 
statement nonetheless has implications about the supernatural in some 
intuitive sense. I don’t know how to circumscribe this broader category, 
but doing so isn’t necessary for present purposes.
Does criterion (E) also judge that the Darwinian theory of evolution 
now has implications about the existence of supernatural beings? I believe 
that the answer is no. By “Darwinian theory,” I mean a pair of claims—that 
all the organisms alive today (on earth) trace back to a common ancestor10 
INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY AND THE SUPERNATURAL 79
and that natural selection has been an important cause of the similarities 
and diﬀ erences we observe among extant organisms.11 With Darwinian 
theory understood in this way, consider the following two statements: 
(i) either the Darwinian theory is false or a supernatural being exists; (ii) 
either the Darwinian theory is false or no supernatural beings exist. Of 
course, a theist who thinks that God is a supernatural being will endorse 
(i) and a naturalist will endorse (ii). But notice that someone who has no 
opinion on whether naturalism is true and has the same agnostic att itude 
towards Darwinian theory has no basis for accepting either. In this sense, 
Darwinian theory is at present neutral on the question of whether there 
are supernatural beings.12 Here we fi nd an important diﬀ erence between 
ID theory (whether it is minimalistic or more contentful) and the theory 
of evolution.
5. Is the Supernatural Implication Religious?
The epistemic criterion (E) judges that the mini-ID theory now implies 
that there exists a supernatural intelligent designer who created one or 
more of the minds found in nature. Should this existence claim be viewed 
as a religious statement? Obviously, the claim falls short of asserting that 
the designer in question has all the characteristics of the Christian God. 
However, that isn’t enough to show that the mini-ID theory isn’t religious; 
aft er all, there are religions other than Christianity. Perhaps, if the super-
natural intelligence to whose existence the mini-ID theory is committ ed 
were worthy of veneration, that would show that the theory has religious, 
and not just supernatural, implications. If ID theorists wish to deny this, 
they need to explain why.
I formulated premise (1) so that it is restricted to objects in nature that 
exhibit irreducibly complex features. Defenders of the mini-ID theory need 
to explain why their theory should be restricted in this way. Perhaps they 
will want to argue that a supernatural intelligent designer is an eternal and 
self-sustaining being, and thus does not need a cause external to itself to come 
into existence or to remain in existence. Or perhaps they will maintain that 
a supernatural designer is a simple being, and therefore won’t exhibits com-
plex features at all. Their answer can’t be that their theory is agnostic about 
the existence of supernatural designers, for as we have just seen, it is not.
6. Conclusion
Deciding whether the mini-ID theory has supernatural and religious 
implications is not as straightforward as seeing whether the word “God” 
appears in the statement “each irreducibly complex system found in nature 
was designed and produced by an intelligent being.” When independently 
plausible further assumptions are taken into account, the mini-ID theory 
entails the existence of a supernatural intelligent designer who made at 
least one of the minds found in nature.
Along the way, I argued that the Darwinian theory of evolution is silent 
on the question of whether God (assumed to be a supernatural being) exists. 
Can the same be said of other contemporary scientifi c theories? Johnson 
(1991, pp. xxx, 114–15) contends that naturalism (the view that there are no 
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supernatural beings) has become the reigning ideology within science. He 
regards this as a prejudice that needs to be overcome, urging that science 
as a whole (and not just evolutionary biology) should be transformed into a 
more open-minded enterprise in which hypotheses about the supernatural 
are given a fair hearing. Richard Lewontin (1997), a prominent evolution-
ary biologist, agrees that contemporary scientists accept a commitment to 
naturalism, but does not regard this as a defect; Lewontin contends that 
scientifi c inquiry requires an a priori commitment to materialism, and hence 
to naturalism.
Robert Pennock (1999) replies to Johnson by distinguishing methodological 
from metaphysical naturalism, claiming that science is committ ed only to the 
former. Science must restrict itself to naturalistic explanations, according 
to Pennock, not because it assumes that there are no supernatural beings, 
but because claims about supernatural beings cannot be tested. This is not 
the place to examine Pennock’s methodological thesis, though it is worth 
noting that some claims about supernatural beings (e.g., the claim that an 
omnipotent supernatural being wanted above all that everything in nature 
be purple) are testable (Sober 1993). The point I would make here is a dif-
ferent one—as Pennock (1999) notes, the Darwinian theory of evolution is 
silent on the question of whether a supernatural intelligent designer exists. 
This is not true of the mini-ID theory. In terms of the contents of theories, it 
is ID theory, not evolutionary theory, that has implications concerning the 
existence of supernatural designers.13
University of Wisconsin, Madison
NOTES
1. Although some ID theorists deny that the ID theory is a kind of Cre-
ationism on the grounds that the mini-ID theory makes no mention of God, 
not all ID theorists agree; William Dembski (1995), for example, says that 
“creationism broadly construed” is “the belief that God or some intelligent 
agent has produced life with a purpose in mind [italics mine].”
2. ID theorists frequently depart from the minimality of the mini-ID theory 
in another respect. Davis and Kenyon (1993, p. 39) deny that organisms in dif-
ferent “higher level categories” have common ancestors and Dembski (1995) 
maintains that human beings were specially created. Behe seems to be the only 
leading ID theorist who accepts (albeit “provisionally”) the notion of common 
ancestry (Dembski 1999, p. 250).
3. I use this phrase even though it suggests, misleadingly in my view, that 
reductionism is the issue.
4. It suﬃ  ces for the argument if some human minds are irreducibly com-
plex; it isn’t essential that all of them are.
5. It might be suggested that the mind’s function should be described 
with greater specifi city. This will be a problem for Behe if the specifi city of 
the function description aﬀ ects whether a system is judged to be irreducibly 
complex. However, with respect to the Figure, a more specifi c function ascrip-
tion (e.g., “permits individuals to navigate their environments eﬀ ectively by 
constructing and manipulating mental representations”) seems not to aﬀ ect 
the verdict.
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6. See, for example, Penrose’s (2005, p. 704) summary of the evidence for 
the claim that “the Big Bang . . . took place some 1.4 x 1010 years ago.”
7. Notice that the argument does not require that causes in nature must 
always precede their eﬀ ects, but just that this is so when the causal agent is 
an intelligent designer in nature who designs and constructs an irreducibly 
complex system in nature and the eﬀ ect is that system’s existing and being 
irreducibly complex.
8. Notice that the argument does not require that the universe be fi nite in 
its spatial extent, nor that there be fi nitely many intelligent designers in nature.
9. Some ID theorists do cite the fi nite age of the universe. For example, 
Ross (1998, p. 373) mentions this as part of his formulation of a fi ne-tuning 
argument for the existence of God.
10. Darwin was usually careful to say that the tracing back leads to “one or 
a few” original progenitors; see, for example, Darwin (1859, p. 490). Standard 
formulations of contemporary evolutionary theory now usually go farther, 
based on evidence that Darwin did not have.
11. Evolutionary biologists who are adaptationists go farther, claiming 
that natural selection is the most important or the only important cause of the 
similarities and diﬀ erences we observe among organisms.
12. The claim that our current knowledge does not provide us with an in-
dependently att ested auxiliary proposition that shows that Darwinian theory 
has implications about whether supernatural designers exist is consistent with 
the situation’s changing as knowledge grows. I do not expect this to happen; 
however, the present argument does not depend on making forecasts.
13. My thanks to Glenn Branch, David Christensen, Juan Comesaña, Mat-
thew Davidson, Branden Fitelson, Daniel Hausman, Christopher Hitchcock, 
David Malament, William Mann, Gregory Mougin, Ronald Numbers, Robert 
Pennock, Carolina Sartorio, Larry Shapiro, and the editor and anonymous ref-
erees of this journal for useful suggestions. 
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